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CONFLICT ON THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT:
JUDICIAL CONFUSION AND RACE-CONSCIOUS
SCHOOL ASSIGNMENTS

Philip T. K. Daniel* and Mark A. Gooden**

I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court addressed the question
of race-conscious decision making in student assignment plans
in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School
District No. 1 (PICS). 1 Immediately following the court's
decision, many questioned whether policymaking could ever
focus on such plans in K-12 education. As the courts and other
legal authorities have subsequently interpreted the case, it
seems evident that educational diversity may be a compelling
governmental interest that justifies the implementation of
policies designed to provide some level of racial balance in K-12
education. What constitutes a plan that is narrowly tailored to
meet
this
interest-and
thus
what
constitutes
a
constitutionally permissible plan-is the subject of judicial
confusion.

* William and Marie Flesher Professor of Educational Administration. Adjunct
Professor of Law, The Ohio State University.
** Associate Professor. University of Texas at Austin. Director of The Principalship
Program.
1. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Dist. No. 1 551 U.S. 701 (2007)
[hereinafter PICS].
School districts in Seattle, Washington and Jefferson County, Kentucky
voluntarily adopted race-conscious student assignment plans as both a remedial
measure to address de facto segregation and, coextensively, to achieve the
educational goal of a diverse student body that would be reflective of the racial
make-up of the entire district community. The objective of the activity, according
to school officials, was to promote the pedagogical and social benefits flowing from
diversity in an increasingly pluralistic society and global marketplace.
Phillip T.K. Daniel, Not So Much a Counterpoint as a Call for Change: The Decision of
Parents Involved for Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 and its Impact
on America's Schools, 231 EDUC. L. REP. 511, 512 (2008).

81

82

B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL

[2010

The opinion authored by Chief Justice John Roberts, joined
by three other justices, holds that diversity absent de jure 2
segregation was not a compelling interest for K-12 education. 3
Justice Stephen Breyer's dissenting opinion, joined by another
three justices, holds in contrast that diversity in education is
often a compelling interest absent de jure segregation. 4
Between these two divergent opinions rests Justice Anthony
Kennedy's concurrence; functionally, his concurrence serves as
the court's decision since it is needed to place Roberts' opinion
in the majority.
This Article discusses PICS opinions at length, paying
particular attention to Chief Justice Roberts' plurality and
Justice Kennedy's concurrence. The analysis includes potential
criticism of the plurality opinion and addresses unclear or
inconsistent positions. Careful analysis shows that PICS leaves
much open for interpretation and potential ambiguity. The
following section analyzes four subsequent lower court opinions
attempting to interpret and apply PICS. Comparison of these
opinions and the widely divergent approaches of the four lower
courts employ evidences judicial confusion and inconsistent
application. The examination of these cases demonstrates the
apparent lack of universally applicable standards for courts to
apply in future cases.
For both educators and the attorneys who represent them,
the crucial question remains as to what the PICS decision
means for the future of race-conscious school assignments.

II. FOUR ON THE RIGHT, FOUR ON THE LEFT, AND KENNEDY IN
BETWEEN

The first thing likely to strike any reader of the PICS
decision is that it requires some effort to determine which of
the opinions actually controls. 5 A close reading reveals that
2. Daniel, supra note 1, at 8.
De jure racial discrimination, as defined by the courts in desegregation cases,
occurs in public education when the state or its representative agencies classify
and segregate students according to race and thereby create dual school systems
or racially identifiable schools within a school district. In contrast, de facto
segregation in the public schools refers to a racial imbalance caused by decision
making of private individuals involving social or economic factors such as housing
patterns, rather than any official action.
3. See PICS, 551 U.S. at 720.
4. Id. at 842 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
5. The PICS case contains in fact five separate opinions, this Article analyzes at
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only the portions of the Roberts opinion in which Justice
Kennedy concurs are controlling law, as they are the only
portions of any of the opinions that garnered the votes of a
majority of the Court. It is important, to note, however, that
the Breyer dissent received four votes, and that on certain
issues, Justice Kennedy's swing vote is more closely aligned
with the dissent than the majority. The resulting decision in
this case is at once both intricate and entropic.
This section analyzes and offers a critique of the Roberts
plurality, the Breyer dissent, and the Kennedy concurrence.
This treatment will orient the reader as to each opinion's
approach to the law, some shortcomings and strengths of each
position, and difficulties that emerge in trying to glean a
workable standard from the case.
A. Chief Justice Roberts

Chief Justice Roberts's opinion clarifies, first and foremost,
that any government action in which the state "distributes
burdens or benefits on the basis of individual racial
classifications . . . is reviewed under strict scrutiny." 6
Consequently, a school district's use of racial classification
must be "'narrowly tailored' to achieve a 'compelling
governmental interest."' 7 According to the Roberts opinion, to
date, there are only two compelling governmental interests
that the Supreme Court has identified for which an educational
institution may use racial classifications: remedying racial
discrimination created by law (de jure segregation), and
student body diversity, broadly defined, in the context of higher
education. 8
Chief Justice Roberts wrote that neither of these contexts
was applicable in PICS. 9 Regarding the first compelling
governmental interest of remedying de jure segregation created
by law, he observed that the Seattle School District was not
subject to a court desegregation order at that time. For this
reason, Roberts explained that it was difficult to argue that the
district's efforts at racially influenced assignment decisions

length three of them. For additional information, see PICS 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
6. Id. at 720.
7. !d. (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995)).
8. !d. at 720-22.
9. Id. at 720-21.
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were required in order to comply with a court order to
remediate de jure segregation. 10 Although the Louisville School
District was at one time subject to a desegregation order, upon
compliance with that order, the court closed the proceedings
and certified the district as unitary. 11 As a result, Louisville
school officials were likewise unable to claim that they were
remedying de jure segregation. 12
Further, the Roberts opinion summarily distinguished
Grutter v. Bollinger, 13 a case permitting the use of race in
collegiate admissions decisions. The Chief Justice factually
distinguished between K-12 attendance and a college
education, claiming that the "diversity interest at stake in
[Grutter] ... flowed from the unique First Amendment issues
inhering in the context of high education: [specifically]
expansive notions of freedom of thought and speech associated
with 'institutional' academic freedom." 14
With these two precedents identified and distinguished
from the case at bar, Chief Justice Roberts sought resolution of
the next two questions: first, is there another educational goal
like remedying de jure segregation or student diversity in
higher education that is a compelling governmental interest,
and if so, are the actions by the school districts in PICS
narrowly tailored to achieve this goal?
Chief Justice Roberts first addressed the underlying goals
of the districts' plans. Since the plans were not individualized
in their application, considered only two racial categories
(white and non-white), and identified the number of students
assigned on the basis of race only after the fact, he found that
true goal of the student assignment plans was "directed only to
racial balance, pure and simple." 15 As racial balancing was "an
objective this Court has repeatedly condemned as illegitimate,"
it could not be a compelling governmental interest. 16 In
explaining this positiOn, the Chief Justice argued that
accepting racial balancing without demanding a greater
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Id. at 712.
ld. at 720-21.
Id.

Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
Daniel, supra note 1, at 515 (citing John LaNear, The Misreading of Sweezy;
How Justice Powell Mistakenly Created Institutional Academic Freedom, 201 EDUC. L.
REP. 501 (2006)).
15. PICS, 551 U.S. at 726.
16. ld.
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objective, such as remedying intentional discrimination or
student diversity in higher education, means that race
consciousness could always be a compelling governmental
interest regardless of context. This is because "[a]llowing racial
balancing as a compelling end in itself would 'effectively
assur[e] that race will always be relevant in American life, and
that the "ultimate goal" of "eliminating entirely from
governmental decision-making such irrelevant factors as a
human being's race" will never be achieved."' 17 Interestingly,
Chief Justice Roberts did not purport that the goals behind the
disputed plans in PICS were unjustifiable in all contexts. 18 The
opinion pointed out that neither district framed the plans as
pure racial balancing. 19 Indeed, the goals identified included
the encouragement of racial diversity and the prevention of
racial isolation. 2 Chief Justice Roberts did not find that these
particular goals were insufficiently compelling, but rather that
the plans at issue failed to actually address these goals. 21 To
support this position, the opinion pointed to persuasive
evidence on the record that the districts were unsure as to
what precisely constituted racial diversity or racial isolation. 22
Finally, the Chief Justice discussed the question of narrow
tailoring. "Narrow tailoring requires 'serious, good faith
consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives."' 23 The
Louisville district provided no evidence of district consideration
of alternative options. 24 The Seattle district did consider
alternative options, but Chief Justice Roberts' assessment that
the alternatives "were rejected with little or no consideration"
seems an implicit finding of a failure to consider them in good
faith. 25
With a view toward both school districts, the Roberts
opmwn appears to suggest that the only compelling
governmental interest justifying a student assignment plan

°

17. !d. at 730 (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co .• 488 U.S. 469, 495
(1989) (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 4 76 U.S. 267, 320 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting))).
18. !d. at 747-48.
19. !d. at 725-26.
20. !d. at 715.
21. !d. at 732.
22. !d. at 731.
23. !d. at 735 (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 339 (2003)).
24. !d.
25. !d.
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that takes race into account is one designed to remedy de jure
segregation. 26 Additionally, even in the face of a compelling
governmental interest, Chief Justice Roberts also required
satisfaction of the narrow tailoring test; a student assignment
plan must use racial classifications only as "a last resort." 27

B. Criticism of the Roberts Opinion
This section offers a critique of Chief Justice Roberts'
opinion in PICS on the basis of its seeming adherence to an
ambiguous position of a color-blind constitution advocated in
dissent by Justice Harlan in Plessy v. Ferguson. The analysis
shows that subsequent Supreme Court treatment of the colorblind constitution position leaves dubious evidence of its actual
precedential value and shows significant debate among the
Justices as to its meaning. Chief Justice Roberts' reliance on
this concept is therefore somewhat suspect and casts doubt
upon the validity of his opinion.
As Justices Breyer and John Paul Stevens noted in their
dissents, 28 Chief Justice Roberts's opinion seemed, in some
respects, to ignore significant constitutional precedent by the
Supreme Court holding that the Constitution does not require
color-blind treatment under the law. The Chief Justice instead
appeared to advocate a position much older than Brown v.
Board of Education, 29 namely the view expressed by Justice
John Harlan in his famous dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson:
Our constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor
tolerates classes among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all
citizens are equal before the law. The humblest is the peer of
the most powerful. The law regards man as man, and takes
no account of his surroundings or of his color when his civil
rights as guaranteed by the supreme law of the land are
involved. It is, therefore, to be regretted that this high
tribunal, the final expositor of the fundamental law of the
land, has reached the conclusion that it is competent for a

26. Id. at 749 (Thomas, J., concurring).
27. ld. at 735 (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 519
(1989)).
28. For Justice Stevens's opinion, see id. at 797-803; for Justice Breyer's opinion,
see id. at 803-68.
29. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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State to regulate the enjoyment by citizens of their civil rights
solely upon the basis ofrace. 30

The most obvious problem with this position is that Justice
Harlan wrote in dissent, so his words did not reflect the
Supreme Court's position at the time he wrote them. 31 In order
for the color-blind constitution to have precedential value, some
subsequent decision or decisions must have adopted it; this
proves problematic in trying to justify Chief Justice Roberts'
adherence to Harlan's position. The Supreme Court overturned
Plessy v. Ferguson in 1954 in Brown v. Board of Education. 32 In
this subsequent case, the Supreme Court noted that prior to
Plessy, the Supreme Court had interpreted the Fourteenth
Amendment to prohibit "all state-imposed discriminations
against the Negro race"-a concept distinguishable from Chief
Justice Robert's articulation of the color-blind constitution as
prohibiting discrimination against any racial group. 33 In order
to follow precedent, the Plessy decision did not per se allow
racial discrimination, but rather found that segregated services
such as transportation and education, despite treating races
differently, were separate but still equal and thus not
discriminatory. 34 When the Court issued its decision in Brown
v. Board of Education, it followed the Plessy decision insofar as
it rejected outright racial discrimination, but went further in
holding that segregation was itself discriminatory and
therefore impermissible. 35
While simplified, this timeline it is critically important for
evidencing ambiguity and, perhaps, disingenuousness on the
part of Chief Justice Roberts. The foregoing shows that when
the Supreme Court overturned Plessy, it declined to adopt the
color-blind constitution conceptualized by Justice Harlan. In
fact, in the years following Brown v. Board of Education, it
became quite apparent that the Supreme Court, even if it chose

30. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
31. It has been argued that Justice Harlan intended for his words to be applied

only to African·Americans and not to other groups. See Gabriel J. Chin, The First
Justice Harlan by the Numbers: Just How Great was ''The Great Dissenter?", 32 AKRON
L. REV. 629 (1999).
32. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. at 494·95.
33. Id. at 490·91.
34. ld. at 490.
35. ld. at 493.
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to adopt the color-blind constitution idea, the Court was not
entirely certain what this concept meant. 36
One articulation of the color-blind constitution is found in
Justice Potter Stewart's dissenting opinion in Fullilove v.
Klutznick, joined by Justice William Rehnquist. 37 Justice
Stewart argued that the color-blind constitution not only
prohibited governmental action designed to exclude citizens on
the basis of race, but that it also prohibited governmental
action designed to grant preferential treatment to citizens of
certain races. 38
An alternative formulation of the color-blind constitution is
found in Justice O'Connor's majority opinion in Johnson v.
California, in which she argued that the color-blind
constitution did not prohibit race-based governmental action,
but only required strict scrutiny of any such action. 39
A third iteration of the color-blind constitution--found in
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke more or less
rejects the concept. In partial dissent, Justice Brennan (with
Justices White, Marshall, and Blackmun) argued that Justice
Harlan's conception of a color-blind constitution "has never
been adopted by this Court as the proper meaning of the Equal
Protection Clause. Indeed, we have expressly rejected this
proposition on a number of occasions." 40
Finally, a fourth and divergent approach is found in Grutter
v. Bollinger, wherein dissenting Justices Ginsburg, Souter, and
Breyer argued that the constitution is color conscious rather
than color-blind. 41 Under this construction, race-based
governmental action is impermissible only when it is invidious,
not when it is designed to "prevent discrimination being
perpetuated and to undo the effects of past discrimination." 42
Precisely what, if any, precedential value may be gleaned
from the Harlan dissent in Plessy has been the subject of
significant debate by the Supreme Court, as enumerated above,

36. See Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 343 n.42 (1964) (Black, J., dissenting).
37. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 522 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 522-23.
39. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 513 (2005).
40. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 355-56 (1978) (Brennan,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
41. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 298 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
42. ld. at 302 (quoting U.S. v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 876
(5th Cir. 1966)).
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and by legal scholars as well. 43 The result is that it is unclear
to what extent the Court has ever affirmed the notion of a
color-blind constitution. Even if the Supreme Court has indeed
adopted the concept, it is uncertain what that color-blind
constitution idea means in practical application since the
Justices themselves have strongly disagreed on the meaning.
This judicial discord over the meaning of a color-blind
constitution is strongly visible in the PIGS decision. In
acknowledging that a color-blind requirement need not apply to
citizens if such treatment is the result of court-ordered
desegregation, Chief Justice Roberts evidenced his own
acknowledgment that at least recent Supreme Court precedent
rejected an unqualified articulation of a color-blind
constitution. Chief Justice Roberts' tacit recognition of past
interpretation suggests that, Chief Justice Roberts is arguing
for new acceptance of a color-blind constitution concept. In this
sense, he might simply have attempted to move the Court to a
new post-race position. 44 This position would be something
akin to the Court's decision in Grutter, holding: "The Court
expects that 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences
will no longer be necessary to further the interest [diversity in
higher education] approved today." 45 Regardless if the new
course advocated in the Chief Justice's opinion is a mere
precedential correction or a completely new paradigm, Chief
Justice Roberts' opinion appears to substantially depart from
Supreme Court jurisprudence. 46
Finally, it is important to note that the Chief Justice's
opinion seems to be a rather activist one. Of particular
significance is the willingness of Chief Justice Roberts and the
conservative segment of the court to advocate for what seems to
be little short of a rejection of stare decisis with regard to the
Court's recent rulings on race. The liberal element of the Court

43. E.g., Darlene C. Goring, Private Problem, Public Solution: Affirmative Action
in the 21' 1 Century, 33 AKRON L. REV. 209 (2000); Keith E. Sealing, The Myth of a Color
Blind Constitution, 54 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 157 (1998).
44. See Jeffrey Rosen, The Color Blind Court, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 791 (1996)
(arguing that the origin of this position is Justices Scalia, Thomas, Kennedy, and Chief
Justice Rehnquist).
45. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 310. Note that the meaning of this "holding" is disputed.
See Joel K. Goldstein, Justice O'Connor's Twenty-Five Year Expectation: The
Legitimacy of Durational Limits in Grutter, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 83 (2006).
46. Thomas P. Crocker, Envisioning the Constitution, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 38
(2007).

90

B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL

[2010

advocates a deferential approach to local school districts that
seems to have its roots in federalism. 47

C. Justice Breyer
Justice Breyer's dissent focused on a dramatically different
issue than the Chief Justice's opinion. Justice Breyer argued
that the issue before the Court was critical to educators and
best resolved by educators rather than the Court. 48 This
position, calling for a high level of deference to governmental
policymakers, includes a strong appeal to federalism. 49
Education is typically a state issue, and the Court should
arguably leave states and local school districts to develop
educational policy without judicial interference. 50 Indeed,
Justice Breyer's willingness to grant deference to local school
districts was so great that he even advocated a different level of
scrutiny for race-based student assignment plans. This lower
level of scrutiny would result in relatively little judicial
evaluation of student assignment plans based on efforts of
racially inclusivity. 51 To understand this reasoning, one must
walk step-by-step through the entire Breyer opinion.
Justice Breyer initially asserted that the Roberts plurality
identified a distinction without a difference. 52 He agreed with
the plurality that diversity has historically met the compelling
governmental interest test when performed 'to remedy de jure
segregation. 53 According to Justice Breyer, however, the issue
in PICS involved housing patterns that, absent reassignment
of some students, resulted in neighborhood schools as racially

47. For an argument positing that the decision evidences judicial restraint, see
William E. Thro, The Constitutional, Educational, and Institutional Implications of the
Majority and Concurring Opinions in Parents Involved in Community Schools, 231
EDUC.L.REP.495(2008).
48. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 848·
49 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
49. "Federalism, as it has developed in the United States, is the system in which
power to govern is shared between the national and state governments and where
federal and state officials may respectively have powers that are at once co·extensive
and overlapping." Philip T.K. Daniel & Patrick D. Pauken, The PICS DecisionAcademic Freedom v. Federalism: Consider the Constitutional Implications, 18 TEMP.
POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 111, 133 (2008).
50. See id.
51. PICS, 551 U.S. at 833 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 806.
53. Id. at 843·44.
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segregated as they would be under school segregation laws. 54
Circumstances where schools become racially segregated
despite no legal requirement of racial separation are known as
de facto segregation. For Justice Breyer, regardless if the
segregation at issue results from either de jure or de facto
segregation, district plans like those used by the Seattle and
Louisville school districts "represent local efforts to bring about
the kind of racially integrated education that Brown u. Board
of Education . .. long ago promised-efforts that this Court has
repeatedly required, permitted, and encouraged local
authorities to undertake." 55
According to the dissent, Brown u. Board of Education ruled
that segregation was unconstitutional, and that school districts
must integrate. Precisely how a school district complied with
Brown in attempting to achieve integration was left "to the
judgment of local communities." 56 Because segregation itself
was found unconstitutional, Justice Breyer argued that "the
distinction between de jure segregation . . . and de facto
segregation ... is meaningless in the present context." 57
Justice Breyer also objected to Chief Justice Roberts'
opinion on grounds that the distinction between de jure and de
facto segregation as determined by judicial finding is neither
meaningful nor manageable. 58 The extensive histories of both
the Seattle and Louisville school districts provide some support
for this position. As the plurality opinion pointed out, Louisville
had once been subject to a desegregation order, while Seattle
was never subject to such an order. 59 Justice Breyer, however,
observed that the Seattle school district may quite possibly
have been subjected to such an order had it not entered into a
private settlement agreement that included desegregation. 60 In
other words, both school districts were arguably segregated at
one time, equally in violation of constitutional law; despite this,
under Chief Justice Roberts' analysis, one district could
permissibly use race-based admissions to integrate and the
other district could not, the only distinction being whether the

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

ld.
Id.
ld.
Id.
ld.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at
at
at

806.
803 (Breyer, J. dissenting).
804.
806.
843-44.
720-21.
820-21 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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school district settled the case or took it to court. 61 For Justice
Breyer, this was evidence that the distinction between de jure
segregation and de facto segregation was-at least for the
purposes of constitutional law-a false dichotomy. 62
After dispensing with the de jure/de facto distinction,
Justice Breyer reframed the question and asked, "Does the
United States Constitution prohibit these school boards from
using race-conscious criteria in the limited ways at issue
here?" 63 In answering this question, Justice Breyer identified
several cases in which the Supreme Court had, as a general
principle, granted broad discretion to school districts in the
creation of educational policy. 64 Consistent with this discretion,
the Court found that, "'[A]s a matter of educational policy[,]
school authorities may well conclude that some kind of racial
balance in the schools is desirable quite apart from any
constitutional requirements."' 65
Justice Breyer argued that this position is consistent with
historic equal protection jurisprudence holding that race-based
policymaking is subject to different analyses dependent upon if
the underlying policy seeks to include or to exclude members of
the targeted race. 66 The dissent appears to argue for two
independent race-based approaches depending on what is at
issue: traditional strict scrutiny for racial exclusion policies and
something similar to the rational basis test for racial inclusion
policies. 67
In applying his hybrid rational basis test 6 x to the facts of
PICS, Justice Breyer contended that "the school plans under
review [did] not involve the kind of race-based harm that has
led this Court, in other contexts, to find the use of raceconscious criteria unconstitutional." 69 A guidepost to aid in
identifying whether the use of race considerations is inclusive
61. Id.
62. Id. at 821.
63. Id. at 823.
64. Id. at 822.
65. I d. at 824 (quoting N.C. Ed. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 45 (1971)).
66. Id. at 829.
67. Id. at 832-33.
68. The "rational basis test" is a judicial construction where a finding is made
that government activity affects neither a fundamental right nor implicates a suspect
class, hence, prescribing the appropriate level of judicial scrutiny as rationally related
to a legitimate government interest. See, e.g., 16B Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional Law §
813 (1998).
69. PICS, 551 U.S. at 836 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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and permissible, or conversely exclusive and harmful, Justice
Breyer iterated factors proposed by Judge Alex Kozinski of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Judge
Kozinski found that the use of race is not harmful if "'it carries
no racial stigma and says nothing at all about that individual's
aptitude or ability.'" 70 This, Justice Breyer argued, is a
constitutionally distinct difference-that is, whether the racebased action is intended to result in racial inclusion or racial
exclusion-requiring a different level of scrutiny depending on
the nature of the action. 71
Judge Kozinski took this same position in concurring with
the majority when the PICS case appeared before the Ninth
Circuit. 72 As he posited, the Fourteenth Amendment was
designed to prevent the exclusion of racial minority groups. 73
For this reason, governmental efforts formulated to include
racial minority groups cannot run afoul of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 74 An inclusivity versus exclusivity distinction can
explain seeming factual anomalies regarding race-conscious
actions. The distinction illuminates, for example, why seeking
to preemptively exclude members of racial minority groups
from jury service is prohibited, while consideration of race in
programs aimed at increased participation of racial minorities
in higher education is permitted. 75
Although not addressed in his dissent, Justice Breyer's
distinction between policies of inclusion and policies of
exclusion is itself problematic. The question remains how to
determine if a policy is racially inclusive rather than exclusive.
By way of example, if a citizen is a member of racial group A,
then any policy designed to include more members of racial
group B in a numerically limited activity, such as school
enrollment, results in intentional action that automatically
excludes members of racial group B. Despite this ambiguity, a
clear standard for how a court should determine when a policy
fosters racial inclusion rather than exclusion is, however,
unaddressed by the dissent. Justice Breyer, having offered this
70. !d. (quoting Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District
No. 1, 426 F.3d 1162, 1193-94 (2005)).
71. !d. at 836-37.
72. Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 426 F.3d
1162, 1193 (2005), rev'd, 551 U.S. 701 (2007) (Kozinski, J., concurring).
73. !d.
74. !d. at 1195.
75. !d. at 1193.
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position, ultimately concluded this analysis by applying the
traditional strict scrutiny test in an attempt to demonstrate
that even under the analysis of the Roberts plurality, the
student assignment plans were permissible.
Justice Breyer asserted three reasons that the student
assignment plans articulated a compelling governmental
interest. 76 First, the consequences of de jure segregation
continue long after the underlying laws are struck down. 77 The
continued existence of these consequences ultimately justify
remedy, not whether there is a court order in place formally
acknowledging their existence.n
Secondly, racial diversity has educational benefits for all
students, and racial isolation is educationally harmful for all
students. 79 Taken together, avoiding racial isolation and
ensuring diversity is an important educational goal longrecognized by the Court-and as such, the Court should defer
to the local school board's recognition of this goal as a
compelling one. 80
Finally, since our society is pluralistic, there is value in and
need for a public school system that prepares students for life
in an integrated, pluralistic society. 81 Again, Justice Breyer
argued that more than sufficient evidence exists to support
such an idea, and consequently, the Court should defer to a
local school district's determination that such goals serve a
compelling governmental interest. 82
Taken individually or collectively, Justice Breyer argued
that these three factors offer more than adequate justification
for a finding that the Seattle and Louisville plans served a
compelling governmental interest and therefore satisfied the
first prong of the strict scrutiny test:
The compelling interest at issue here, then, includes an effort
to eradicate the remnants, not of general "societal
discrimination" . . . but of primary and secondary school
segregation . . . it includes an effort to create school
environments that provide better educational opportunities

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

PICS, 551 U.S. at 838-841 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 838.
Id. at 838-39.
Id. at 839.
Id.
Id. at 840.
Id. at 840-41.
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for all children; it includes an effort to help create citizens
better prepared to know, to understand, and to work with
people of all races and backgrounds, thereby furthering the
kind of democratic government our Constitution foresees. If
an educational interest that combines these three elements is
not "compelling," what is? 83

Justice Breyer summarized his position by arguing that in
addition to serving a compelling governmental interest, the
district plans also met the narrow tailoring requirement in that
(1) student choice resolves eighty percent of school
assignments, (2) broad range limitations on the disparity
permissible in a given school are more narrowly tailored than
an affirmative quota or similar approach, and (3) in each
student assignment plan developed to date, race has played a
less central part. 84 For Justice Breyer, continuing to advocate
for some level of deference to the local school board, the plans
at issue in PICS were narrowly tailored to achieve the
compelling governmental interests previously identified. 85

D. Justice Kennedy
,Justice Kennedy opened his concurring opinion with what
appears to be the theme of his position in the case: "In my view
the state-mandated racial classifications at issue . . . are
unconstitutional as the cases now come to us." 86 The key
phrase here is "as the cases now come to us." Justice Kennedy
engaged both the Roberts and Breyer opinions, accepting some
premises from each. The result is that his concurrence is both
the controlling precedent of the case by casting the deciding
vote,-while at the same time representative of only Justice
Kennedy's view. Eight other justices advocated different
positions. In this respect, the Kennedy opinion is somewhat
enigmatic, and thus deserves robust discussion.
Beginning his opinion with a simple premise, Justice
Kennedy rejected Chief Justice Roberts' assertion that the
school districts failed to advance a compelling governmental
interest for the race conscious student assignment plans at
issue. 87 Justice Kennedy determined that, "[d]iversity,
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
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depending on its meaning and definition, is a compelling
educational goal a school district may pursue." 88 Despite his
acceptance that diversity, even in K-12 education, may serve a
compelling governmental interest, he concurred with Chief
Justice Roberts in finding the student assignment plans
unconstitutional. 89 The explanation for this is relatively
straightforward in that Justice Kennedy agreed with Chief
Justice Roberts that the district plans must be subjected to
strict judicial scrutiny; strict scrutiny required the plans to
fulfill a compelling governmental interest while also narrowly
tailored to achieve that interest. 90 In applying this test, Justice
Kennedy acknowledged, without holding, that the student
assignment plans might have a compelling governmental
interest but even in the presence of that interest, the
government still "has the burden of proving that [the] racial
classifications are 'narrowly tailored measures."' 91 Here,
Justice Kennedy found that the narrow tailoring requirement
was not satisfied because the school districts' disputed use of
racial classifications was made in "terms so broad and
imprecise that they cannot withstand strict scrutiny." 92
One should recall, nevertheless, Justice Kennedy's
introductory comment that the plans at issue were
unconstitutional "as the cases now come to us." 93 The
particular facts at issue that led to Justice Kennedy's opinion
included the specific plan requirements and their execution. He
further outlined the precise policies and practices he found
objectionable. For example, he found an absence of narrow
tailoring because it was unclear who made the formal decision
to reject a student's request for assignment when it would
adversely impact racial balance; the facts were also unclear
whether this decision was subject to any administrative
oversight. 94 Justice Kennedy also objected to the lack of
explanation in the district plans for how similarly situated
students should be treated when only one could be placed in a

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

ld.

Id.

ld.
ld. (quoting Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005)).
Id. at 785.
93. !d. at 782.
94. ld. at 785.
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particular school. 95 The concurrence pointed out that many of
these objections might be satisfactorily addressed in practice. 96
Despite this fact, because strict scrutiny requires that a school
district bear the burden of proving narrow tailoring,
compliance with this requirement demands carefully
articulated policies. 97 In other words, the court "cannot
construe ambiguities in favor of the state." 98
Another of Justice Kennedy's objections focused on the
actual racial categories utilized in the plans. 99 In the Seattle
plan, students were divided into two racial categories: white
and non-white. 100 Justice Kennedy found that these two "crude
racial categories" did not evidence a carefully constructed,
narrowly tailored means by which to achieve the compelling
interest of educational diversity. 101
The remainder of the concurrence addresses concerns
raised by both Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Breyer. What
results is a much clearer understanding of his views. First, he
rejected what he referred to as the Chief Justice's "all-toounyielding insistence that race cannot be a factor" in instances
Justice Kennedy would himself probably allow. 102 While Chief
Justice Roberts' admonition-that to end racial inequality, the
government must cease treating individuals unequally based
on race-might appeal to the other conservative members of
the Court, Justice Kennedy believed such a position contradicts
more than fifty years of experience that suggests "the problem
before us defies so easy a solution." 103 Justice Kennedy agreed
with Chief Justice Roberts that the PICS case included the
promulgation of a compelling governmental interest unique
from those previously recognized by the Court-including
Grutter. -The concurrence nonetheless departed from the
Chief Justice in that Justice Kennedy suggested that past
recognition of compelling interests such as diversity in student
enrollment in higher education "help inform the present

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
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inquiry," and suggested that similar compelling interests might
be identifiable under different factual circumstances. 104
Similarly, while Justice Kennedy's aligned some of his
views with Justice Breyer's dissent, he heavily criticized
Justice Breyer for eschewing the strict scrutiny test in favor of
a "permissive strict scrutiny test (which bears more than a
passing resemblance to rational-basis review)." 105 The
imposition of such a different standard of review for
governmental inclusive race-based actions than for exclusive
race-based actions would impose "no principled limit and would
result in the broad acceptance of governmental racial
classifications in areas far afield from schooling." 106
Justice Kennedy concluded by stating:
The decision today should not prevent school districts from
continuing the important work of bringing together students
of different racial, ethnic, and economic backgrounds. Due to
a variety of factors-some influenced by government, some
not-neighborhoods in our communities do not reflect the
diversity of our Nation as a whole. Those entrusted with
directing our public schools can bring to bear the creativity of
experts, parents, administrators, and other concerned citizens
to find a way to achieve the compelling interests they face
without resorting to widespread governmental allocation of
benefits and burdens on the basis of racial classifications. 107

The foregoing makes it seem that Justice Kennedy was reticent
to accept the remedy of de facto segregation as a compelling
governmental interest. He did, however, refuse to accept the
Chief Justice's position that in most circumstances remedying
de facto segregation in public schools cannot be a compelling
governmental interest. 108
Justice Kennedy's concurrence leaves unanswered two very
serious questions that have since generated judicial confusion.
The first question is whether Justice Kennedy implicitly
recognized a compelling governmental interest that permits
schools to use race-based policies to remedy de facto
segregation. Although he rejected Chief Justice Roberts'
negative answer to this question, he himself did not render a

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
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positive response to the issue. For this reason, all educators are
well advised to proceed cautiously before pursuing race-based
policies. As discussed below, PICS is the second opportunity
presented to Justice Kennedy to explicitly recognize a
compelling governmental interest in race-based actions taken
by public educators. On each occasion he declined to
acknowledge such an interest outright, instead only
acknowledging
an
abstract
potential
a
compelling
governmental interest. Educators and attorneys alike are left
to wonder why Justice Kennedy avoided identifying what
qualifies as a compelling governmental interest in this context.
The second question asks, assuming there is a compelling
governmental interest, how can a school district fashion a
policy or program to meet the narrow tailoring requirement?
Critical to such an inquiry is the issue of how Justice Kennedy
viewed the compelling interest in the education context. The
compelling interest could be expressed as pursuit of
educational diversity, or conversely as avoiding racial isolation
in education. Candor requires concession this may be a false
dichotomy. The simple fact of the matter is, however, that
Justice Kennedy's opinion does little to clarify what the
compelling governmental interest would be, assuming there
even IS one.
On the one hand, one can conceive that educational
diversity might qualify as a compelling governmental interest,
thereby permitting a school district to affirmatively pursue
actions designed to maintain diversity at or further diversify a
local school. Conversely, one can conceive a more narrow
compelling governmental interest that permitted a local school
district to act only to prevent racial isolation in education.
Under the latter formulation, a district might engage in racebased action only when the district had already become de facto
segregated. The broader approach, in contrast, would allow
school districts to act affirmatively to avoid finding themselves
in such a situation in the first place. Whether Justice Kennedy
would find either of these or some alternative paradigm a
compelling governmental interest is unclear the absence of
bright-line judicial guidance leaves school districts with little
direction as how to narrowly tailor their actions.
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Succinctly put, Justice Kennedy's opinion creates an opaque
tapestry, and consequently, those courts that have
subsequently interpreted the decision in PICS have reached
some remarkably different conclusions as to its meaning and
application.

Ill. JUDICIAL CONFUSION
Relatively little authoritative judicial interpretation is
available to give contour to the PICS case. No federal appellate
court has analyzed the PICS decision. The federal district
courts that have discussed the case have typically done so
where the examination of the case was either not outcome
determinative or the PICS decision was simply deemed
inapplicable. Notwithstanding these limitations, the courts
that have studied the case generally agree that Justice
Kennedy's concurrence is the authoritative position. When it
comes to applying that opinion to the facts before them, lower
court judges have interpreted the case with fairly significant
variation.
In short, the existing judicial commentary seems to agree
that Justice Kennedy's opinion controls and that educational
diversity, or the avoidance of racial isolation in education,
might be a compelling governmental interest. Under what
circumstances and how a plan can be narrowly tailored to meet
that interest is, at best, crepuscular. The following analysis of
four subsequent opinions demonstrates the broad spectrum of
interpretation of the PICS case by lower courts. Without clear
standards by which to evaluate future cases, the resultant
opinions are divergent in nature and show the general
confusion of lower courts.
A. Fisher: Remedying past injustice manifested as de facto

segregation is impermissible
The first of these cases is Fisher u. Tucson Unified School
District. 109 In Fisher, the defendant school district sought a
certificate of closure terminating court oversight of district
desegregation efforts. 110 While the court ordered that the
school district submit a full report documenting compliance
109. Fisher v. Tucson Unified Sch. Dist., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61679, at 1 (2007).
llO. ld. at 3.
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with the desegregation settlement, it also reviewed the
district's student assignment policy in light of the recent PICS
decision. 111 The court in Fisher found that the student
assignment policy, like those at issue in PICS, "'[did] not
provide for a meaningful individualized review of applicants'
but instead relie[d] on the race of the student in a nonindividualized, mechanical way." 112 According to the lower
court, PICS: made it quite clear that race-based student
assignments required pursuant to a desegregation decree
become constitutionally prohibited once the vestiges of prior
intentional segregation are eliminated." 113 The policy at issue
in Fisher prohibited student transfer where the transfer would
"'further imbalance the ethnic makeup of the home school."' 114
As in PICS, the student assignment plan at issue could result
in an individual's race determining the outcome. Rather than
simply holding that this was unconstitutional under PICS, the
court broadly held that such a policy is itself "unconstitutional
segregation unless [it is] aimed at remedying de jure
segregation." 115
Though not explicit, the court apparently read Justice
Kennedy's concurrence primarily in light of Chief Justice
Roberts' opinion. Justice Kennedy signed onto the Chief
Justice's opinion in several sections, including where Chief
Justice Roberts said:
Our cases recognized a fundamental difference between those
districts that had engaged in de jure segregation and those
whose segregation was the result of other factors. School
districts that had engaged in de jure segregation had an
affirmative constitutional duty to desegregate; those that
were de facto segregated did not. 116

Importantly, as noted, Justice Kennedy implicitly rejected the
Roberts position that remedying de facto segregation could
never be a compelling state interest:
The cases here were argued upon the assumption, and come
to us on the premise, that the discrimination in question did

111. !d. at 33.
112. !d. at 34 (quoting PICS, 551 U.S. at 723).
113. !d. at 35.
114. ld. at 34. (quoting Tucson Unified School District's Policy).
115. !d. at 40.
116. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Dist. No. 1 551 U.S. 701 (2007)
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
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not result from de jure actions. And when de facto
discrimination is at issue our tradition has been that the
remedial rules are different. The State must seek alternatives
to the classification and differential treatment of individuals
by race, at least absent some extraordinary showing not
present here. 117
The question emerges as to how authoritative is Justice
Kennedy's admonition to avoid classifications of different races
unless under extraordinary circumstances not shown in the
PICS facts. This question is easily identifiable but difficult to
answer. Chief Justice Roberts and three other justices found
that only the remedy of de jure segregation is a permissible
governmental interest-at least in terms of remedying the
consequences of past discrimination by law. Justice Kennedy
clearly states his own position as general agreement, but with
the caveat of the final line: "at least absent some extraordinary
showing." This language leaves open some exceptional
circumstance in which remedying de facto segregation might be
found a compelling governmental interest the issue remains as
to the precedential value of this phrase. Without Justice
Kennedy's fifth vote, the plurality opinion is not the majority
opinion, therefore leaving possible applications for Kennedy's
narrow caveat. The language is perhaps mere dicta.
Regrettably, the court in Fisher did not specifically address
Justice Kennedy's qualifying phrase, and seems to have held
only, as in PICS, that de jure segregation may be addressed
through remedies inappropriate for de facto segregation.
While the Fisher court's declining to comment on Justice
Kennedy's cautionary language is troublesome, there is an
additional and far more problematic issue in Fisher since
Justice Kennedy leaves an open door for an education exception
in some future case. In PICS, Justice Kennedy did, with the
exception of his "extraordinary showing" caution, seem to agree
with the Chief Justice that remedying de facto segregation
cannot be justified on the basis of addressing the consequences
of past de jure segregation. In the concurrence, however,
Justice Kennedy indicated that educational diversity, or at
least avoiding racial isolation in education, might be a
compelling interest. 118 The court in Fisher completely ignored

117. Id. at 796.
118. ld. at 797-98.
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this portion of Justice Kennedy's opinion, that while other
courts have identified this as a key part of the opinion.
One of two scenarios best explains the analytical
shortcomings of the Fisher decision. One option is that the
decision is the result of insufficient context. Fisher seems to
correctly apply the portion of the Chief Justice's opinion with
Justice Kennedy in concurrence, that found remedying de facto
segregation is not justified by a need to address the
consequences of past de jure segregation. The court in Fisher,
nonetheless, overlooked two important limitations that Justice
Kennedy imposed on his concurrence: first, the Fisher court
included no discussion of what might constitute an
"extraordinary showing," and secondly, was completely silent
on the two points Justice Kennedy's suggested might qualify as
a compelling governmental interest-namely, educational
diversity or at least avoiding racial isolation in education. 119
One possible explanation of this lack of context may be that
the student assignment plan in Fisher was subordinate to the
primary issue of whether the district had achieved unitary
status. 120 Under these circumstances, the PICS discussion may
have been raised by the court rather than the parties, and thus
the lack of discussion of Justice Kennedy's limitations on the
Chief Justice's opinion in Fisher may be explained by an
absence of dialogue on the issue by the parties in motions,
briefs, or hearings.
The second possible scenario is that this decision was
simply a means to an end and that rather than overlooking
Justice Kennedy's limitations, the court deliberately
disregarded them. The Fisher court's silence at to these
limitations makes it uncertain if the court disregarded them
nefariously or merely inadvertently, or if the court simply
chose not to analyze these issues in the written ruling.
Regardless of the foregoing analysis, Fisher is the postPIGS decision that most resembles Chief Justice Roberts'
opinion. However, because it does not align well with the
Kennedy concurrence or other post-PJCS cases, it remains to be
seen to what extent the Fisher decision will be deemed
authoritative.
119. !d. at 796-98.
120. See generally id. at 715 (describing a school district found to have reached
unitary status by removing its previous policy of segregation to the extent it was
practicable).
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B. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action: Remedying de facto
segregation is permissible if for the purpose of educational
diversity or at least preventing racial isolation in education
Other courts have looked to the PICS case and reached a
very different conclusion than that arrived at in Fisher. The
court in Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of the
University of Michigan, found that remedying de facto
segregation is permissible if for the purpose of education
diversity or at least preventing racial isolation in education. 121
Numerous plaintiffs filed suit, alleging that a state
constitutional amendment prohibiting the state's use of
affirmative action violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution. 122 The defendant, University of
Michigan, moved to dismiss. 123
In partially granting and partially denying the motion to
dismiss, the court, albeit superficially, discussed PICS as the
Supreme Court's reaffirmation that "states have a 'compelling
interest [in] remedying the effects of past intentional
discrimination' with race-conscious programs"-de jure
segregation-and that "[i]t also appears that a majority of the
justices agree that schools may employ race-based programs to
address 'the problem of de facto resegregation in schooling."' 124
The court found this precedent m Justice Kennedy's
concurrence wherein he stated:
The plurality opinion is at least open to the interpretation
that the Constitution requires school districts to ignore the
problem of de facto resegregation in schooling. I cannot
endorse that conclusion. To the extent the plurality opinion
suggests the Constitution mandates that state and local
school authorities must accept the status quo of racial
isolation in schools, it is, in my view, profoundly mistaken. 125

Although the court in Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action
spent minimal time discussing PICS, it did recognize Justice
Kennedy's mixed message on the subject, noting that while
action to cure de facto segregation is apparently permissible, it

121. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich .• 539 F.
Supp. 2d 924, 957 (E.D. Mich. 2008) [hereinafter Coalition].
122. ld. at 924.
123. Id. at 944.
124. ld. at 957.
125. PICS, 551 U.S. at 788 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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is "fundamentally different" from the "obligation to cure past
discrimination" that is the remedy for de jure segregation. 126
Unfortunately, the court did not address the deceptively simple
question of what this "fundamental" difference may be.
Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action is an important case
because it held-quite differently from the court in Fisherthat the limitations to the Chief Justice's opinion put forth by
Justice Kennedy in his concurrence are in fact the
authoritative decision in PICS. As a result of this, that court
agreed with Justice Kennedy's implicit rejection of the position
that only de jure segregation may be the basis for raceconscious remedial action. However, the lower court's limited
treatment of the case also reflects the fact that Justice
Kennedy has not affirmatively stated that race-conscious
remedial action is permissible to address de facto segregation.
The resulting decision in Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action
seems to more accurately represent Justice Kennedy's position
than the analysis Fisher, but still fails to provide meaningful
interpretation and guidance for educators.

C. Meredith: De facto segregation may be addressed for the
purpose of educational diversity or at least preventing racial
isolation in education and, for guidance as to permissible
means, one should look to the actions specifically listed in
Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in PICS
The views expressed in Fisher and Coalition to Defend
Affirmative Action evidence continued confusion on the parts of
lower courts on how best to interpret Justice Kennedy's
concurrence. An alternative approach to the previously
discussed cases involves applying Justice Kennedy's opinion as
literally as possible. The Louisville school district in PICS
implicitly took this approach in subsequent litigation.
In Meredith v. Jefferson County Board of Education, a case
following PICS, the plaintiff requested that the court mandate
a certain student's enrollment in a specific school within the
district. 127 The court considered the plaintiff's request moot
since the student was enrolled in the desired school prior to the

126. Coalition, 539 F. Supp. 2d at 957.
127. Meredith v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64473, at 2
(W.D. Ky. 2007).
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hearing. 128 However, the court discovered during this dispute
that the defendant school district utilized different attendance
zones for black and white students. 129 This practice was not
previously known to nor considered by either the district court
or the United States Supreme Court. The district court ruled
that the
race-based attendance
zone
practice
was
impermissible, as "such an approach appears to be the
functional equivalent of a race-based binary selection process,
which a solid majority of the current Supreme Court has
rejected in these circumstances." 130 The court, nonetheless,
cited Justice Kennedy's concurrence as precedent, language
stating that "[s]chool boards 'are free to devise race-conscious
measures to address the problem in a general way and without
treating each student in a different fashion solely on the basis
of a systematic, individual typing by race."' 13 1
In order to explain the meaning of this finding, the court
looked to the opinion itself, implying that permissible action on
the part of the school district must conform to the list of actions
specifically enumerated by Justice Kennedy in his concurrence:
School boards may pursue the goal of bringing together
students of diverse backgrounds and races through other
means, including strategic site selection of new schools;
drawing attendance zones with general recognition of the
demographics of neighborhoods; allocating resources for
special programs; recruiting students and faculty in a
targeted fashion; and tracking enrollments, performance, and
other statistics by race. These mechanisms are race conscious
but do not lead to different treatment based on a classification
that tells each student he or she is to be defined by race, so it
is unlikely that any of them would demand strict scrutiny to
be found permissible. 132
While treating Justice Kennedy's list as exhaustive is
convenient and appears judicially manageable, this approach
does not seem entirely consistent with Justice Kennedy's
intentions. Justice Kennedy made it clear that the list provided
was not meant to be exhaustive:

128. Id. at 9.
129. ld. at 2.
130. Id. at 4.
131. /d. at 5 (quoting Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle Sch. Dist.
No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 788-89 (2007)).
132. PICS, 551 U.S. at 789 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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If school authorities are concerned that the student-body
compositions of certain schools interfere with the objective of
offering an equal educational opportunity to all of their
students, they are free to devise race-conscious measures to
address the problem in a general way and without treating
each student in a different fashion solely on the basis of a
systematic, individual typing by race. 133

The court in Meredith concluded that regardless what may
or may not be permissible, Chief Justice Roberts and three
other judges firmly shunned decision-making that can result in
race becoming the sole determining factor, and observed that
"Justice Kennedy, while not so unequivocal, was nevertheless
equally clear" that this kind of racial classification was
impermissible. 134
Of particular concern with this approach is whether the
benefit a judicially manageable test outweighs the detriment
caused by an inflexible set of permissible options. This is best
considered by the issue in this case. The Louisville school
district utilized race-based attendance zones. The court found
that this was impermissible because this practice was not one
enumerated by Justice Kennedy, and further, it was a practice
most analogous to the race-based student assignment plan
struck down by the Court in PICS.
Two potential problems arise from this analysis. First and
most obvious, Justice Kennedy expressed in his opinion that
his words were not intended to be treated legalistically. 135
While it is understandable that a cautious court would do so
anyway, the result is something of a judicial shortcut that
ultimately provides little guidance for educators.
The second problem with the analysis in Meredith is that
there is no explanation of how the impermissible race-based
attendance zones were distinguishable from the permissible
attendance zones drawn "with general recognition of the
demographics of neighborhoods" mentioned in Justice
Kennedy's concurrence. 136 While it is certainly possible to
consider these distinguishable practices, without an
examination of how they are distinguishable, the holding in
Meredith also lacks meaningful guidance, despite its adherence
133.
134.
135.
136.

/d. at 788-89.
Meredith, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6447:3, at 4.
PICS, 551 U.S. at 797-798 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
/d. at 789.
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to Justice Kennedy's list of acceptable practices. In short, even
if educators apply PICS legalistically and engage only in the
practices specifically identified in the Kennedy concurrence as
permissible, significant ambiguity may still plague their action.
Educators are left to determine whether a specific district
policy (such as race-based attendance zones) falls within the
scope of one or more of the identified permissible practices).
Reliance on Justice Kennedy's non-exclusive list of permissible
practices in the PICS decision, may prove only to be the
illusion of compliance.
Finally, perhaps the most interesting interpretation of the
PICS case is found in Hart u. Community School Board of
Brooklyn. 137 The court in Hart moved far from the Chief
Justice's opinion, finding that PICS actually holds that Grutter
applies to K-12 education as well as higher education. 138 Hart
appears to be the other bookend to Fisher in that each seems,
to some extent, to seek the means for an already determined
end.
In Hart, the defendant school district moved to terminate a
desegregation order and requested a certificate of closure. 139
The prospective interveners argued that although a formal
certificate of closure had not previously been requested or
granted, the court in 1990 had found the district had remedied
the underlying de jure segregation constitutional violations. 140
Because of this finding, the school district's continued use of
race in student assignments violated the Equal Protection
Clause. 141 The court granted the motion to terminate the
desegregation order and issued a certificate of closure. 142
The court then stated that in PICS "Justice Kennedy
acknowledged the need in some instances to take race into
account in school assignments." 143 With no further explanation
of how Justice Kennedy's concurrence supported the
proposition, the court cited Brown u. Board of Education for the
precedent that segregation "has a detrimental effect" on

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Hart v. Cmty. Sch. Bd. of Brooklyn, 536 F. Supp. 2d 274 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).

Id. at 283.
ld. at 275.
Id. at 276.
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Id. at 284.
Id. at 282.
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education. 144 The court further announced that "[t]he same
considerations that permit race as one factor among many that
may be considered in college and graduate schools under
Grutter and Bakke should be applied to grade schools where
characteristics for future success or failure are imprinted on
students." 145
The application of the Grutter standard to grades K-12,
though poorly substantiated in Hart, is not without
justification. Admittedly, one problem with this argument is
that Justice Kennedy dissented in Grutter-indicating that he
would be unlikely to find Grutter applicable elsewhere.
Significantly, a review of Justice Kennedy's dissent in that case
reflects a position quite similar to his position in PICS:
To be constitutional, a university's compelling interest in a
diverse student body must be achieved by a system where
individual assessment is safeguarded through the entire
process. There is no constitutional objection to the goal of
considering race as one modest factor among many others to
achieve diversity, but an educational institution must ensure,
through sufficient procedures, that each applicant receives
individual consideration and that race does not become a
predominant factor in the admissions decision making. 146

The inference when comparing these two cases is that Justice
Kennedy acknowledges that there might be a compelling
governmental interest in educational diversity or at least
avoiding racial isolation in both K-12 and higher education, but
that the processes at issue in both Grutter and PICS were not
sufficiently narrowly tailored to achieve these interests.
Unfortunately, this inference is not so intuitive in context of
the actual opinions. First, Justice Kennedy agreed to the
plurality opinion written by Chief Justice Roberts with regard
to Parts I, II, III-A, and III-C of PICS. In the conclusion of Part
III-A, Chief Justice Roberts specifically identifies the Grutter
decision, noting:
The Court in Grutter expressly articulated key limitations on
its holding-defining- a specific type of broad-based
diversity and noting the unique context of higher educationbut these limitations were largely disregarded by the lower
courts in extending Grutter to uphold race-based assignments
144. !d. at 283.
145. !d.
146. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 392-93 (2003).
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in elementary and secondary schools. The present cases are
not governed by Grutter. 147
While this would seem to suggest that Justice Kennedy
similarly rejects the applicability of Grutter, he elsewhere
somewhat favorably discusses that case. In his concurrence, he
found the dissent's reliance on Grutter "understandable." 148
Justice Kennedy, however, found it "simply baffling" to think
that either of the student assignment plans would hold up
under Grutter. 149
According to Justice Kennedy, in Grutter "the Court
sustained a system that, it found, was flexible enough to take
into account 'all pertinent elements of diversity."' 150 In PICS,
nevertheless, the school plans at issue were inflexible and
overly-broad:
If those students [subject to the assignment plans at issue]

were considered for a whole range of their talents and school
needs with race as just one consideration, Grutter would have
some application. That, though, is not the case. 151
Again, one is left with the distinct impression that Justice
Kennedy had no quarrel with educational diversity, or at least
avoiding racial isolation in K-12 education, as a compelling
governmental interest. Justice Kennedy rather appears to
argue that even if they were compelling governmental
interests-and he seems almost coy in his refusal to say that
they qualify-the Seattle and Louisville student assignment
plans would still fail for lack of narrow tailoring, the same
objection that he raised in Grutter.

IV. CONCLUSION
Although there has been no authoritative interpretation of
PICS since the Supreme Court reached its decision, the
consensus view of the lower courts is that Justice Kennedy's
concurrence is the authoritative opinion of the court. 152 The few

147. Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S.
701, 725 (2007).
148. Id. at 792 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
149. ld. at 793 (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 341).
150. ld.
151. Id.
152. Note that this is not a definitively resolved issue. For a recent article
portraying the Roberts opinion as the more definitive portion of the decision see
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extant federal trial court decisions are, by and large, in
agreement that Justice Kennedy has implicitly accepted
educational diversity and avoiding racial isolation in education
as compelling governmental interests.
While there remains a great deal of uncertainty is how a
school district can narrowly tailor a student assignment plan in
order to achieve such an interest without running afoul of the
Equal Protection Clause. At the very least, it seems that those
actions listed specifically in Justice Kennedy's concurring
opinion are constitutionally permissible, though as is seen in
Meredith, the most recent decision, it is not always clear how
those listed actions will be defined. It is also apparent that any
race-based student assignment policy that results in one
individual's race as the determinative factor in school
enrollment is likely impermissible. There remains, however, a
world of uncertainty between these two points, as evidenced by
the significant nuances offered by the lower courts.
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